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1 
OFF-CAMPUS CYBERBULLYING: FIRST AMENDMENT 
PROBLEMS, PARAMETERS, AND PROPOSAL 
David R. Hostetler, J.D.* 
To a certain extent, law must forever be subject to 
uncertainty and doubt; not from the obscurity and fluctuation 
of decisions . . . but from the endless complexity and variety of 
human actions . . . [T]here will remain immeasurable 
uncertainties in the law, which will call for the exercise of 
professional talents, and the grave judgments of courts of 
justice. 
– U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story (1779–1845)1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Bullying pervades our nation’s schools.2 Too many students 
suffer too much, too often, driving some to suicide. The bullying 
problem is being increasingly exposed, researched, quantified, 
debated, written about, and legislated against. However, courts 
have been slow to weigh in and help shape the law to adapt to 
this growing reality. A recent federal court opinion describes 
one view of the problem: 
The typical victim of bullying is more anxious and insecure 
than her peers. . . . Bullying brings with it a whole host 
of . . . issues. It impairs concentration and leads to poorer 
 
* The author is an Associate Professor in education law, ethics, and policy at 
Appalachian State University in Boone, North Carolina and is a licensed North 
Carolina attorney specializing in education and school technology law. He is a graduate 
of Duke University School of Law (J.D.), Duke University Graduate School (M.A. in 
Political Science), Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary (M.A.T.S.) and Westminster 
College (B.A.). He may be contacted at hostetlerdr@appstate.edu. The author would 
like to thank Adam Parker, Carla Hermida, and Adam Hopler for their research and 
editing assistance in the preparation of this article.   
 1 JOSEPH STORY, THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 70−71 
(William W. Story ed. 1852). 
 2 See generally, RACHEL DINKES ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS & 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY: 2009, 
(2009), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010012.pdf (providing nationwide 
statistics relating to cyberbullying, including related deaths and instances of non-fatal 
student and teacher victimization).  
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academic performance. Additionally, victims are more likely 
to engage in antisocial behavior, have increased health 
problems, and struggle to adjust emotionally. 
. . . . 
The end of school does not bring an end to the damage done 
by years of harassment. As a result of this trapped setting, 
where harassment is a repeated occurrence, victims carry 
lasting emotional and psychological scars into adulthood.3 
In this article, “bullying,” is used broadly as shorthand for 
any communication that is not a true threat of physical harm, 
but instead goes only so far as to offend, demean, ridicule, 
embarrass, harass, or intimidate others.4 Cases involving true 
threats of harm are not included in the term’s use or 
substantially addressed herein. Courts have clearly held that 
such threats, if substantiated by evidence, are not protected 
speech or, at a minimum, courts have allowed school 
administrators to take protective and/or disciplinary action 
without much legal difficulty.5 
Cyberbullying is a type of bullying that occurs in electronic 
forums. It exponentially expands bullying opportunities, the 
number of victims, and the legal risks. This expansion is 
primarily attributable to electronic media’s ease of use, 
accessibility, anonymity, speed, breadth of distribution, and 
capacity to be easily recorded, stored, and redistributed. 
Cyberbullying can threaten victims’ educational wellbeing both 
on and off campus because of its debilitating emotional, social, 
 
 3 T.K. v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 779 F. Supp. 2d 289, 304−05 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(citations omitted). This case also cited a study that found those who were bullied for at 
least three years in grades six through nine had higher rates of depressive symptoms 
and lower self-esteem when they were twenty-three years old. Id. at 305. 
 4 In reality, there are technically and legally significant differences among 
various forms and degrees of offensive speech. These include: (1) speech that is 
bothersome or offensive (e.g., mean, disparaging, lewd); (2) harassing (frequently 
offensive, ridiculing, obstructive, and often based on a person’s individual traits); (3) 
bullying (physically, socially, or otherwise threatening speech often by someone in a 
position of physical, electronic or other form of one-sided control); or (4) threatening 
(physical, reputational, or social). Where such distinctions are required herein they will 
be noted.  
 5 A more recent example is Wynar v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist., No. 11-17127, 
2013 WL 4566354, (9th Cir. Aug. 29, 2013) (student’s threatening instant messages 
conveyed a clear threat of harm and substantial disruption due to specific statements 
that he had access to guns that he intended to use against specific students on a 
specific day—the anniversary of the Columbine shootings, thus warranting a 90-day 
expulsion.). 
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and other consequences. Nevertheless, few courts have 
addressed the legally complicated problem of off-campus 
cyberbullying. The extent, therefore, to which schools can 
effectively address this problem without running afoul of First 
Amendment free speech rights is unclear.6 
As far back as 1969, in Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District, the Supreme Court recognized the 
“collision” of students’ free speech rights and school safety.7 
This collision of rights has resulted in treatment by the courts 
that is often inconsistent and confusing. Today, students are 
seldom without personal electronic devices that provide 
constant access to each other’s speech, and new avenues from 
which to reach large audiences associated with their schools. 
Previously, a student was only able to shout from his isolated 
“soapbox” to those within physical earshot. Now, the same 
student’s speech is amplified considerably, as he or she may 
tweet, blog, or post repeatedly, quickly, cheaply, and 
anonymously to anyone with an Internet connection, including 
the targets of cyberbullying attacks. Given today’s cacophony of 
electronic speech (“e-speech”), what is a school official to do? 
This article aims to clarify the law surrounding 
cyberbullying, to provide recommendations on how to address 
the problem, and to point out where legal uncertainties 
preclude definitive answers. To simplify the analysis of 
permissible actions rectifying the effects of cyberbullying, this 
article proposes a marriage of the Supreme Court’s “substantial 
disruption” standard in Tinker and the “educational 
deprivation” standard found in Title IX. This approach is 
preferable to the current disjointed approach for three reasons. 
First, the educational deprivation standard has an element of 
predictability. Second, the standard comports with the explicit 
acknowledgement in Tinker of a school’s responsibility to 
protect its students. Third, use of this commonly applied 
standard would lead to a uniform approach among courts when 
hearing cases regarding cyberbullying, rather than the widely 
 
 6 Legally, cyberbullying is multi-dimensional, involving an extensive array of 
state and federal legal claims and principles. These claims include defamation, 
invasion of privacy, infliction of emotional distress, cyberstalking, and other electronic-
related criminal laws. These are not substantially addressed herein due to space and 
topic limitations. 
 7 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507−08 (1969). 
Hostetler Macro.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/3/14  2:03 PM 
4 B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL [2014 
 
diverging standards that exist today under interpretations of 
First Amendment cases. 
The following analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I 
provides an overview of Supreme Court precedents relating to 
student speech in schools and their development over time. 
Part II provides summaries revealing the difficulties lower 
courts have found in applying the traditional student speech 
cases in the cyberbullying and online speech contexts. Part III 
discusses the “educational deprivation” standard of Title IX, 
provides additional cases where it has been applied, and 
provides an analytical protocol based on a merging of the 
“substantial disruption” standard found in Tinker and its 
progeny with the “educational deprivation” standard found in 
Title IX. This article concludes by considering the practical 
implications of merging the “substantial deprivation” standard 
with the “substantial disruption” standard. 
II. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENTS: TINKER, BETHEL, 
HAZELWOOD, AND MORSE 
To date, the United States Supreme Court has not 
substantively opined on a case involving off-campus student e-
speech. Consequently, its 1969 opinion in Tinker v. Des Moines 
remains the seminal student free speech decision in today’s 
vastly different environment. In Tinker, students had planned 
a protest of the Vietnam War by wearing black armbands to 
school.8 Fearing that the armbands might incite conflict and 
disruption, school administrators created a policy prohibiting 
protesting behavior.9 When students violated the ban, school 
administrators suspended them.10 The Court upheld the 
students’ right to wear the armbands.11 In support of its 
decision, the Court reasoned that the political expression 
involved did not “materially or substantially disrupt” school 
operations, nor did it create a reasonably foreseeable threat of 
doing so.12 The Court held that the administrators only had an 
 
 8 Id. at 504. 
 9 Id. at 508. 
 10 Id. at 504. 
 11 Id. at 514. 
 12 Id. at 513−14. 
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“undifferentiated fear”13 of a potential disruption: 
There is here no evidence whatever of petitioners’ 
interference, actual or nascent, with the schools’ work or a 
collision with the rights of other students to be secure and to be 
let alone. Accordingly, this case does not concern speech or 
action that intrudes upon the work of the schools or the rights 
of other students.14 
The Court expounded on the Tinker standard in the 1986 
case, Bethel School District v. Fraser, where the Court upheld a 
short-term suspension of a high school student who gave a lewd 
campaign speech at a student assembly on behalf of a friend 
running for class president.15 In support of its holding, the 
Court declared that the suspension was reasonably justified 
because the school had a legitimate role in promoting 
fundamental civic values and socially acceptable behavior, as 
well as in protecting other students from offensive 
communications.16 
Furthermore, in 1988, the Court upheld a high school 
principal’s decision to retract student-written articles for a 
school newspaper that discussed teen pregnancy and divorce 
within the school community in Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier.17 The Court held that the principal had the 
discretion to censor such speech because the newspaper was 
tied to the official school curriculum and invoked pedagogical 
concerns,18 since the article about pregnancy would have 
revealed sensitive personal information,19 and because both 
retracted articles might have given the false impression that 
the school endorsed the articles.20 
Finally, in 2007, the Court upheld a high school student’s 
suspension for violating a school policy prohibiting the 
promotion of illegal drug use in Morse v. Frederick.21 Morse and 
his friends raised a 14-foot banner that declared, “BONG HiTS 
 
 13 Id. at 508. 
 14 Id. (emphasis added). 
 15 Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). 
 16 Id. at 681–83. 
 17 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273−74 (1988). 
 18 Id. at 273. 
 19 Id. at 274. 
 20 Id. at 271. 
 21 Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007). 
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4 JESUS” during a school-organized event at which students 
gathered along both sides of the street in front of the school to 
watch the Olympic Torch Relay pass by.22 The Court 
determined that the principal could reasonably interpret the 
banner as promoting illegal drug use.23 Thus, the Court held 
that the principal acted reasonably in taking down the banner 
and suspending the student.24 The Court reasoned that schools 
have an important role in protecting students from drug-
related influences, especially in times of prevalent illegal drug 
use.25 
Currently, Tinker and its progeny offer the primary basis 
(“substantial disruption”) for determining the constitutionality 
of schools restricting or disciplining students for their off-
campus, personal speech. Cyberbullying, however, poses a far 
more difficult legal challenge than the physical, on-campus 
speech issues faced in Tinker. As one court aptly stated, “the 
advent of the Internet has complicated analysis of restrictions 
on speech. . . . Indeed, Tinker’s simple armband, worn silently 
and brought into a Des Moines, Iowa classroom, has been 
replaced by . . . complex multi-media web site[s], accessible to 
fellow students, teachers, and the world.”26 
Particularly important for this article is Tinker’s less-cited 
recognition of the “rights of other students to be secure and to 
be let alone.”27 A review of lower court decisions applying 
Tinker to off-campus cyberspeech reveals that courts, more 
often than not, uphold student speech rights for offensive off-
campus cyberspeech directed at students or staff (e.g., graphic, 
lewd, and demeaning speech) if schools are unable to show or 
reasonably forecast a substantial disruption at school. These 
points are addressed more specifically in Part III. 
 
 22 Id. at 397. 
 23 Id. at 401. 
 24 Id. at 408. 
 25 Id. 
 26 J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 863−64 (Pa. 2002) 
(citations omitted).  
 27 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969). 
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III. CONFUSING AND CONFLICTING LOWER COURT 
CYBERBULLYING DECISIONS 
A.  Tinker and J.C.’s Off-Campus “Rant” Video 
Particularly instructive is a 2010 California federal district 
court case, J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified School 
District.28 J.C., a high school student, videotaped a 
conversation with her friends at a restaurant after school.29 
The four-and-a-half minute video contained profane, crude, and 
derogatory comments about a thirteen-year-old fellow student 
(referred to as “C.C.”).30 In the video, J.C. and her friends called 
C.C. “a slut,” “spoiled,” and “the ugliest piece of shit I’ve ever 
seen in my whole life.”31 J.C. encouraged such comments during 
the video, telling one friend “to continue with the Carina 
rant.”32 Another student was heard asking, “[a]m I the only one 
that doesn’t hate Carina?”33 
That night, J.C. posted the video on YouTube and told five 
to ten other peers, including C.C., to watch it.34 About fifteen 
students saw the video that night; webpage data showed 
approximately ninety “hits” to the site, including many by 
J.C.35 The next day, J.C. claimed she heard ten students at 
school talking about the video.36 Unsurprisingly, C.C. was 
initially very upset, humiliated, and hurt.37 The morning 
following the video post, she missed the beginning of her first 
class after spending twenty to thirty minutes with the school 
counselor, who eventually persuaded C.C. to attend her class.38 
Administrators investigated all morning.39 Several students 
talked about the video while at school, but there was no 
 
 28 J.C. ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (C.D. 
Cal. 2010). 
 29 Id. at 1098. 
 30 Id. 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. at 1108. 
 34 Id. at 1098. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 1098–99. 
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evidence that any student accessed it on any school computer.40 
By noon, the matter had been fully addressed, according to the 
school’s counselor.41 In the litigation, the school presented no 
evidence of any lasting impact that C.C. suffered academically 
or otherwise as a result of the video.42 
The school suspended J.C. and she filed suit.43 She claimed 
the school violated her free speech rights, in part, because her 
video was protected First Amendment speech, made and posted 
off-campus on her own computer, on her own time.44 Following 
a comprehensive review of free speech case law across 
jurisdictions,45 the court applied Tinker’s substantial disruption 
standard and analyzed the free speech claim.46 The trial judge 
identified three major issues: First, whether the video 
substantially disrupted the school.47 Second, whether it was 
reasonably likely to cause a future substantial disruption.48 
Lastly, whether the video interfered with the rights of other 
students.49 
First, the judge found no evidence of any substantial 
disruption.50 Its analysis, in this regard, is an important 
reminder to school officials and attorneys that “substantial 
disruption” is a qualitative standard that requires evidence of 
significant one-time or cumulative impact, not just that some 
impact has occurred.51 The court further clarified the 
 
 40 Id. at 1099. 
 41 Id. at 1117−18. 
 42 Id. at 1118–19. 
 43 Id. at 1097, 1099.  
 44 Id. at 1100.  
 45 Id. at 1100–17. 
 46 Id. at 1117–23. 
 47 Id. at 1117–19.  
 48 Id. at 1119–22.  
 49 Id. at 1122–23.  
 50 Id. at 1117.  
 51 Specifically, the court held: 
For the Tinker [substantial disruption] test to have any reasonable limits, the 
word “substantial” must equate to something more than the ordinary personality 
conflicts among middle school students that may leave one student feeling hurt or 
insecure. Likewise, the Court finds that the mere fact that a handful of students 
are pulled out of class for a few hours at most, without more, cannot be sufficient. 
Tinker establishes that a material and substantial disruption is one that affects 
“the work of the school” or “school activities” in general . . . . Thus, while the 
precise scope of the substantial disruption test is still being sketched by lower 
courts, where discipline is based on actual disruption (as opposed to a fear of 
pending disruption), the School’s decision must be anchored in something greater 
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contextual dimensions of disruption findings, stating: 
The substantial disruption inquiry is highly fact-intensive. 
Perhaps for that reason, existing case law has not provided 
clear guidelines as to when a substantial disruption is 
reasonably foreseeable. There is, for example, no magic 
number of students or classrooms that must be affected by the 
speech. One court has held that a substantial disruption 
requires something more than “a mild distraction or curiosity 
created by the speech” but need not rise to the level of 
“complete chaos.” . . . Not surprisingly, however, the gulf 
between those two concepts swallows the vast majority of 
factual scenarios. Further complicating matters is the fact 
that the Court has not uncovered any cases, in this Circuit or 
otherwise, that address speech targeted at a particular 
student, as is the case here.52 
Secondly, the judge concluded that there was no evidence of 
a reasonably foreseeable substantial disruption.53 If “a school 
can point to a well-founded expectation of disruption— 
especially one based on past incidents arising out of similar 
speech—the restriction may pass constitutional muster.”54 
Judge Wilson noted, instead, that the principal had only a 
speculative, unsubstantiated fear of disruption and that the 
impact on C.C. was not substantially harmful.55 
J.C.’s video was not violent or threatening. There was no 
reason for the School to believe that C.C.’s safety was in 
jeopardy or that any student would try to harm C.C. as a 
result of the video. Certainly, C.C. never testified that she 
feared any type of physical attack as a result of the video. 
Instead, C.C. felt embarrassed, her feelings were hurt, and she 
temporarily did not want to go to class. These concerns cannot, 
without more, warrant school discipline. The Court does not 
take issue with Defendants’ argument that young students 
often say hurtful things to each other, and that students with 
limited maturity may have emotional conflicts over even 
minor comments. However, to allow the School to cast this 
 
than one individual student’s difficult day (or hour) on campus. Id. at 1119 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted) (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 514 and J.S. 
v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d at 852). 
 52 J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d  at 1111 (emphasis added) (citations 
omitted).  
 53 Id. at 1121. 
 54 Id. at 1116. 
 55 Id. at 1117–1119.  
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wide a net and suspend a student simply because another 
student takes offense to her speech, without any evidence that 
such speech caused a substantial disruption of the school’s 
activities, runs afoul of Tinker.56 
Lastly, Judge Wilson observed that Tinker recognized 
schools’ authority to restrict speech that “impinge[s] upon the 
rights of other students,” even if the disruption is not 
foreseeable.57 However, the extent to which this may be the 
case remains unclear and was not relevant to this case.58 
Underlying the court’s determinations described above was the 
fact that there was insufficient evidence presented by the 
Defendants of any actual or reasonably foreseeable substantial 
disruption or threat to the rights of others.59 Had they been 
able to present more specific evidence of a substantial impact to 
the school and/or on C.C., their likelihood of prevailing would 
have increased accordingly.60 This offers a pointed lesson to 
school officials when investigating similar situations and to 
attorneys gathering and presenting evidence to a court. 
B. Other Individual Impact Cases and Tinker’s “Rights of 
Others” Prong 
In light of existing case law, the question remains whether 
and to what extent schools may restrict cyberspeech when that 
speech: is expressed off-campus; does not enter the campus or 
transform itself into “on-campus” speech (subject to Bethel or 
 
 56 Id. at 1117 (emphasis added). 
 57 Id. at 1122 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 509 (1969)). 
 58 J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1122–23 (noting that “the Court is not 
aware of any authority . . . that extends the Tinker rights of others prong so far as to 
hold that a school may regulate any speech that may cause some emotional harm to a 
student. This Court declines to be the first”). 
 59 Id. at 1121 (“A comparison of this case to the record in LaVine helps illustrate 
the Defendants’ evidentiary shortcomings.”) (citing Lavine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 
F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
 60 Judge Wilson also noted that some courts have required an additional 
showing that the student who generated the speech could reasonably foresee that the 
speech would reach the campus. J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1107. The judge 
concluded that J.C. could reasonably foresee that her video would “make its way to 
campus.” Id. at 1108. She posted it on the Internet for the public to see, and 
deliberately contacted other students that night, including C.C., urging them to view 
the video on YouTube. Id. Furthermore, J.C. made no efforts to guard against the video 
making its way onto campus. Id. at 1109. Without deciding whether this prong was in 
fact a requirement, Judge Wilson held it was satisfied regardless.  
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Morse standards); does not cause and is not reasonably likely to 
cause substantial disruption to school operations; does not 
cause or threaten physical harm, but does reasonably threaten 
one individual’s or group’s educational well-being. 
Presently, there is limited case law that clearly addresses 
this narrow question.61 It is reasonable to predict that some 
courts may allow schools to restrict such speech under Tinker’s 
“substantial disruption” and/or its “rights of others” prongs. 
Some courts may merge the two prongs: speech that invades 
the “rights of others” is a “substantial disruption.” Other courts 
may distinguish the two prongs: speech that does not 
substantially disrupt (generally) may still invade the rights of 
others.62 There are several cases hinting at these possibilities. 
A case that roughly matches the above criteria was decided 
in July 2011 by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools.63 Kara Kowalski, a high 
school student, created a MySpace discussion group page called 
“S.A.S.H.” which, according to Kowalski, stood for “Students 
Against Sluts Herpes,” although another student testified that 
it stood for “Students Against Shay’s Herpes” (referring to the 
specific student victim, Shay).64 Kowalski invited 
approximately a hundred people on her “friends” list to join the 
group, of which about two-dozen of Kowlaski’s classmates 
responded.65 One student submitted several derogatory 
postings about Shay, including images of her with red dots 
imprinted on her face to simulate herpes and a sign near her 
pelvic area indicating, “Warning: Enter at your own risk.”66 
Within hours of posting, Shay’s father contacted the student 
 
 61 Mary-Rose Papandrea, Student Speech Rights in the Digital Age, 60 FLA. L. 
REV. 1027, 1094 (2008) (“As of this writing, no court has invoked Tinker’s rights-of-
others prong as the sole basis for upholding restriction on student speech in the digital 
media.”). 
 62 It is also conceivable that a court may apply Morse on the basis of protecting 
student safety. This seems unlikely given that Court’s explicit directions that its 
holding applied narrowly to the facts of that case. Furthermore, the Court treated the 
matter as “on-campus” expression, unlike the scenario presented above. 
 63 652 F.3d 565 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 64 Id. at 567. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. at 567–68. In a second photograph, one student posted an image of Shay, 
captioning her face with a sign stating “portrait of a whore.” Id. at 568. Most other 
postings focused on Shay N. Numerous student comments celebrated the derogatory 
page and/or were eager for Shay N. to see it. 
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who posted the images and Kowalski to express his anger and 
to ask for the removal of the page. However, Kowalski was 
unable to delete the webpage and remove the photos.67 Shay 
and her parents met with school officials the next day and filed 
a harassment complaint pursuant to the school’s bullying and 
harassment policy.68 Shay then returned home for the 
remainder of the day due to the discomfort of attending classes 
with the same students who made these incendiary remarks on 
the MySpace page.69 
Ultimately, the school board suspended Kowalski for five 
days (reduced from ten days), imposed a ninety-day “social 
suspension” precluding her from attending any school events in 
which she was not a direct participant, and banned her from 
the cheerleading squad for the remainder of the year.70 
Kowalski sued officials and the school system asserting, among 
other things, a First Amendment free speech claim, contending 
that the MySpace group was purely off-campus private speech 
not subject to the school’s jurisdiction.71 The trial court ruled in 
favor of the defendants on summary judgment.72 Applying a 
unique analysis, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the ruling in favor 
of the defendants.73 Notably, the court applied Tinker’s 
substantial disruption and “rights of others” standards, 
appearing to conjoin them.74 In applying the standard, the 
court relied on numerous generalized assumptions about the 
disruptive effects of the “verbal attacks” and “defamatory 
accusations” on Shay N. and the school.75 The court was 
particularly dismissive of off- and on-campus boundaries that 
 
 67 Id. at 568. 
 68 Id. at 568−69. 
 69 See id. at 568. 
 70 Id. at 568–69. 
 71 Id. at 567. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 577. 
 74 See id. at 572–73. The court held that Kowalski’s MySpace page, by 
interfering with Shay N.’s educational rights and wellbeing, substantially disrupted 
the school’s “work and discipline of the school.” Id. Specifically, the court stated, 
[w]e are confident that Kowalski’s speech caused the interference and disruption 
described in Tinker . . . This is not the conduct and speech that our educational 
system is required to tolerate, as schools attempt to educate students about 
“habits and manners of civility” or the “fundamental values necessary to the 
maintenance of a democratic political system.” Id. 
 75 Id. 
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have dictated the outcome of most other courts in favor of 
plaintiffs: 
This [off-campus speech] argument . . . raises the 
metaphysical question of where her speech occurred when she 
used the Internet as the medium. Kowalski indeed pushed 
her computer’s keys in her home, but she knew that the 
electronic response would be, as it in fact was, published 
beyond her home and could reasonably be expected to reach 
the school or impact the school environment. She also knew 
that the dialogue would and did take place among Musselman 
High School students whom she invited to join the “S.A.S.H.” 
group and that the fallout from her conduct and the speech 
within the group would be felt in the school itself. 
. . . . 
[R]egardless of where her speech originated, . . . the speech 
was materially and substantially disruptive in that it 
“interfer[ed] . . . with the schools’ work [and] colli[ded] with 
the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.”76 
The court also cited several indicators of actual disruption: 
the fact that Shay N. missed a day of school to avoid further 
abuse and that her parents considered the MySpace comments 
as “school-related” leading them to file their complaint.77 The 
court assumed, without evidence, the reasonable foreseeability 
of other disruptions: 
[H]ad the school not intervened, the potential for continuing 
and more serious harassment of Shay N. as well as other 
students was real. Experience suggests that unpunished 
misbehavior can have a snowballing effect, in some cases 
resulting in “copycat” efforts by other students or in 
retaliation for the initial harassment. 
. . . . 
To be sure, it was foreseeable in this case that Kowalski’s 
conduct would reach the school via computers, smartphones, 
and other electronic devices, given that most of the “S.A.S.H.” 
group’s members and the target of the group’s harassment 
were Musselman High School students.78 
The Fourth Circuit’s analysis is arguably not in the judicial 
 
 76 Id. at 573 (emphasis added).  
 77 Id. at 573–74. 
 78 Id. at 574 (emphasis added). 
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mainstream due to its highly speculative and conclusory 
determinations about the effect (real or potential) of Kowalski’s 
MySpace page on Shay N. and the school. Whereas most court 
opinions79 require specific and compelling evidence or the 
likelihood of substantial disruption, the Fourth Circuit in 
Kowalski seemed satisfied with what it considered common 
sense assumptions, and less concerned with concrete evidence 
of actual and foreseeable effects.80 
In the 2006 case of Harper v. Poway Unified School 
District,81 the Ninth Circuit upheld a student suspension after 
the student wore a t-shirt to school condemning homosexuality 
during a “day of silence” that was intended to promote 
tolerance of gay students.82 The court determined that the 
shirt’s message was a “verbal assault” based on one of three 
core-identifying characteristics (i.e., race, religion, and sexual 
orientation), and was therefore “harmful” speech to 
“particularly vulnerable” students.83 
The court explicitly chose not to apply Tinker’s “substantial 
disruption” prong and, instead, applied its “rights of others” 
prong.84 In doing so, it made several significant declarations. 
For example, the “rights” prong applies not just to deprivations 
of legal rights, but also to soft rights, such as the right to “be 
left alone” and to privacy against “unwanted communication,” 
 
 79 See supra Part III.A. 
 80 There are many of these conclusory remarks through the opinion. For 
example, “[Kowalski’s and other students’] conduct was indisputably harassing and 
bullying, in violation of Musselman High School’s regulations prohibiting such 
conduct.” Kowalski, 652 F.3d 565, at 572 (emphasis added). In another example, the 
court states, “We are confident that Kowalski’s speech caused the interference and 
disruption described in Tinker . . . .” Id. (emphasis added). Even more evidence of this 
“common sense” approach is indicated in the court’s acknowledgment that “[Kowalski] 
knew that the electronic response . . . could reasonably be expected to reach the school 
. . . and that the fallout from her conduct . . . would be felt in the school itself.” Id. at 
572 (emphasis added).  
 81 Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated as 
moot, 549 U.S. 1262 (2007). 
 82 Id. at 1171. While this case carries no precedential value (see Bowler v. Town 
of Hudson, 514 F. Supp. 2d 168, 179 (D. Mass. 2007)), it still carries persuasive value. 
See Zamecnik v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28172, at *20–*21 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 17, 2007). The case also demonstrates how a court may choose to apply 
Tinker’s “rights of others” prong as a separate standard form Tinker’s “substantial 
disruption” standard.  
 83 Harper, 445 F.3d at 1182.   
 84 Id. at 1183–84. 
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particularly for “persons [who] are ‘powerless to avoid’ it.”85 For 
instance, the Harper court stated that 
[t]here is nothing in Tinker that remotely supports the 
dissent’s contention that the rights to “be secure and to be let 
alone” are limited to rights such as those that protect against 
“assault, defamation, invasion of privacy, extortion and 
blackmail.” Security and privacy entail far more than freedom 
from those torts [i.e., legal rights]. Nor does the dissent offer 
any reason why the rights to security and privacy do not 
include freedom from verbal assaults that cause psychological 
injury to young people.86 
The court identified “psychological health and well-being 
[as well as] educational development” as protected rights.87 The 
court further noted some of the related tangible indicators and 
consequences, including the risk of and decline in academic 
failure, difficulty concentrating, fear for one’s safety, feelings of 
isolation, truancy, and dropping out of school.88 Remarkably, 
the court assumed all or many of these “deprivations” occurred 
based simply on “self-evident” notions and “common sense,” 
without citing any evidence: “you don’t need an expert witness 
to figure out the self-evident effect of certain policies or 
messages.”89 The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning and conclusions 
extend Tinker’s “rights of others” prong very broadly and 
uniquely. To what extent other circuits are likely to follow suit 
is unclear.90 
 
 85 Id. at 1178; contra id. at 1198 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (disputing the 
majority’s position that if the speech was directed at non-minority individuals, the 
analysis would require the more difficult substantial disruption standard, not the 
“rights of others” standard applied in this case for protecting gay students). Judge 
Kozinski further explained that “[t]he ‘rights of others’ language in Tinker can only 
refer to traditional rights, such as those against assault, defamation, invasion of 
privacy, extortion and blackmail, whose interplay with the First Amendment is well 
established.” Id. at 1198. Konzinski further states that “[s]urely, this language is not 
meant to give state legislatures [via additional civil protections] the power to define the 
First Amendment rights of students out of existence by giving others the right not to 
hear that speech.” Id. 
 86 Id. at 1178 n.18 (citation omitted).  
 87 Id. at 1179. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. at 1180 (quoting dissenting Judge Kozinski’s own language from a prior 
Ninth Circuit decision).  
 90 This problem is made plain by Judge Kozinksi in dissent: 
I find this a difficult and troubling case . . . On the record to date, the school 
authorities have offered no lawful justification for its actions . . . . It is entirely a 
judicial creation, hatched to deal with the situation before us, but likely to cause 
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Several cases show that some courts will uphold 
disciplinary actions under Tinker’s “substantial disruption” 
standard based largely on the impact the Internet speech has 
on the targeted individual.91 One such example is found in J.S. 
v. Bethlehem Area School District,92 the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court upheld a fourteen-year-old’s expulsion for posting a 
“Teacher Sux” website.93 The site contained “derogatory, 
profane, offensive, and threatening comments,” primarily about 
the student’s algebra teacher and his principal.94 One page 
began, “Why Should She Die?” (referring to the teacher) and 
invited readers to “give me $20 to help pay for the hit man.”95 
That page also included images of the teacher being 
decapitated (with blood dripping from her neck) and morphing 
into Adolph Hitler.96 
The teacher consequently became ill and suffered 
sleeplessness, stress, anxiety, and loss of weight, causing her to 
take a medical leave of absence for the rest of the school year. 
This required replacing her with three different substitute 
teachers.97 The evidence showed that J.S., at least once, opened 
the website on a school computer and showed a classmate and 
that other students and staff became aware of the site as well.98 
The principal testified that morale at the school was “worse 
than anything he had witnessed” in his forty-year professional 
 
innumerable problems in the future. Id. at 1192, 1200. 
 91 For example, in a 2008 California case, a court denied a student’s request for 
a preliminary injunction, thus allowing a school to suspend a student for posting a 
YouTube video dramatizing the murder of her teacher. O.Z. v. Bd. of Trs. of Long Beach 
Unified Sch. Dist., No. CV 08-5671 ODW (AJWx), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110409 at 
*1−*2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 9, 2008). Key factors were the school’s duty to “protect the 
teacher and address safety concerns” and the impact on the teacher who “feared for her 
safety and became physically ill.” Id. at *9–*10 (also noting, “it would appear 
reasonable, given the violent language and unusual photos depicted in the slide show, 
for school officials to forecast substantial disruption of school activities.”). 
 92 J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002). 
 93 Id. at 869 (Also, the summary of this and other cases in this section are 
quoted and adapted from a prior publication by the author. See David Hostetler, School 
Cyberlaw Part I: Cyberspeech: First Amendment and Defamation, 34 SCH. L. BULL. 4 
(2003), available at http://sogpubs.unc.edu/electronicversions/slb/slbfal03/article1.pdf). 
 94 Bethlehem, 807 A.2d at 851. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. Further, some pages urged the teacher’s dismissal because of her looks 
and personality and also referred to her as a “bitch” or “stupid bitch” and associated 
her with a picture of a witch. Id. 
 97 Id. at 852. 
 98 Id. at 851–52. 
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career, comparing its effect to the death of a student or staff 
member.99 
In this instance, the court determined that the speech came 
“onto campus” because J.S. opened the webpage in one 
instance, as did other students.100 Following this 
determination, the court had to decide how to apply Tinker 
(substantial disruption) and Bethel (lewd on-campus speech).101 
Relying mostly on Tinker, the court ruled that the web site 
substantially disrupted the school community, especially 
because of its effect on J.S.’s algebra teacher: 
[I]n this day and age where school violence is becoming more 
commonplace, school officials are justified in taking threats 
against faculty and students seriously . . . .102 
Further examples are found in the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals, which issued two separate but related en banc 
opinions in June 2011. Each addressed virtually identical facts 
involving separate school systems: students suspended for 10 
days for posting lewd and derogatory MySpace parody profiles 
of their respective principals.103 In Layshock v. Hermitage 
School District,104 the circuit court upheld the trial court’s 
 
 99 Id. at 853. 
 100 Id. at 865. 
 101 Id. at 669. 
 102 Id. 
 103 J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc); 
Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205, 219, n.1 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(Jordan, J., concurring) (noting that “[t]his case and J.S. [v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist.] 
are not related cases in the sense of being linked on our docket, but they raise nearly 
identical First Amendment issues. It is no accident that they were taken en banc at the 
same time, were argued on the same date, and are being decided simultaneously.”). 
 104 Layshock ex rel. Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (2011). The 
MySpace profile at issue in the case was especially disturbing. The court noted: 
It all began when Justin Layshock used his grandmother’s computer to access 
[MySpace] where he created a fake internet “profile” of his Hickory High School 
principal . . . . Justin created “bogus answers” to the site’s survey questions, 
applying a theme of “big” because the principal was, apparently, a large man. 
Some of these answers included numerous self-designating and demeaning 
statements: “big steroid freak,” smoking a “big blunt” (marijuana), “big pills,” 
“skinny dipping,” getting drunk a “big number of times,” “big whore,” and “big fag.” 
Layshock listed the principal’s “Interests” as “Transgender, Appreciators [sic] of 
Alcoholic Beverages.”  
News of the site “spread like wildfire” at the school. Some students, including the 
principal’s daughter, alerted the principal to the site’s existence. After 
investigating, the principal determined the profile to be “degrading,” “demeaning,” 
“demoralizing,” and “shocking.” Though the principal expressed interest in 
pressing criminal charges, none were ever filed. The school system eventually 
suspended Justin for ten days and imposed other discipline. 104 Id. at 205−10.  
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ruling in favor of Layshock.105 The school district did not 
dispute that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the 
off-campus profile caused a substantial disruption.106 The court 
rejected the district’s argument that the profile entered the 
campus to become “on-campus” speech; i.e., the personal 
MySpace profile was “on-campus” speech because the student 
opened the site on a school computer to show classmates, and 
the student copied a picture of the principal from the school 
webpage to create the fake profile.”107 Justin Layshock opened 
the site one time on a school computer to show classmates108 
and also copied a picture of the principal from the school 
webpage to paste into the page.109 The court stated, “we do not 
think that the First Amendment can tolerate the School 
District stretching its authority into Justin’s grandmother’s 
home and reaching Justin while he is sitting at her computer 
after school in order to punish him for the expressive conduct 
that he engaged in there.”110  
J.S. v. Blue Mountain School District111 was the companion 
case decided by the Third Circuit en banc panel. It too involved 
a derogatory MySpace parody about the school principal.112 The 
profile was initially available to the public, but J.S. made the 
 
 105 Id. at 207. 
 106 Id. at 216. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. at 209. 
 109 Id. at 207–08. 
 110 Id. at 216.  
 111 J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
 112 The court noted: 
The profile contained crude content and vulgar language, ranging from nonsense 
and juvenile humor to profanity and shameful personal attacks aimed at the 
principal and his family. For instance, the profile lists M-Hoe’s [the principal’s] 
general interests as: “detention, being a tight ass, riding the fraintrain [apparently 
referring to his relationship with his wife], spending time with my child (who looks 
like a gorilla), baseball, my golden pen, fucking in my office, hitting on students 
and their parents.” [Citation omitted.] In addition, the profile stated in the “About 
me” section: 
 
HELLO CHILDREN[.] yes. it’s your oh so wonderful, hairy, expressionless, 
sex addict, fagass, put on this world with a small dick PRINCIPAL[.] I have 
come to myspace so i can pervert the minds of other principal’s [sic] to be just 
like me. I know, I know, you’re all thrilled[.] Another reason I came to 
myspace is because - I am keeping an eye on you students (who[m] I care for 
so much)[.] For those who want to be my friend, and aren’t in my school[,] I 
love children, sex (any kind), dogs, long walks on the beach, tv, being a dick 
head, and last but not least my darling wife who looks like a man (who 
satisfies my needs ) MY FRAINTRAIN. Id. at 921. 
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site private the next day so that only “invited” friends could 
view it.113 Although numerous students saw the profile, nobody 
considered the content to be true, or suspected the principal of 
any of the alleged activities.114 The principal, after 
investigating, threatened criminal action against J.S. and her 
parents, had law enforcement officials summon them to 
headquarters for questioning, and got MySpace to remove the 
profile.115 
The court began its analysis by recognizing the 
“comprehensive,” though “not boundless,” authority of teachers 
and other public school officials on school premises.116 
Reviewing the law, the court characterized Tinker as the 
“general rule” in117 student school speech cases, with Fraser, 
Hazelwood, and Morse being the “exceptions” to the rule (i.e., 
for regulating speech not otherwise substantially disruptive).118 
Based on this characterization of the law, it found J.S.’s 
MySpace parody only caused some disruption at the school.119 
For example, administrators spent time investigating and had 
to alter some meetings.120 Additionally, teachers had to quiet 
students down in classrooms.121 The court viewed these as only 
minor disruptions.122 It also determined that the speech was 
not subject to Fraser’s “lewd speech” analysis because the 
speech stayed off-campus,123 except for a printed hardcopy 
requested and reviewed by the principal.124 
The court applied Tinker’s “the rights of others” prong in a 
footnote that is important to this article’s consideration of the 
relationship between “substantial disruption” and individual 
impact at school: 
The School District seizes upon language in Tinker that is 
arguably dicta, claiming that it was justified in abridging 
 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 Id. at 922. 
 116 Id. at 925–926. 
 117 Id. at 929−30. 
 118 Id. at 927. 
 119 Id. at 928−29. 
 120 Id. at 929. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. at 930. 
 123 See id. at 937–38. 
 124 Id. at 932. 
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J.S.’s First Amendment rights because the profile defamed 
[the principal]. In Tinker, the Court [also] discussed its 
concern with “the rights of other students to be let alone.” As 
a result, the Court appeared to indicate that school officials 
could stop conduct that would “impinge upon the rights of 
other students.” Later in the opinion, the Court reiterated the 
point, but referred simply to “invasion of the rights of others.” 
Although [the principal] is not a student, the School District 
claims J.S’s speech is not immunized by the First Amendment 
because [the principal’s] right to be free from defamation fits 
within this language in Tinker. We are not aware of any 
decisions analyzing whether this language applies to anyone 
other than “students,” but we do note that our cases have 
employed both of these clauses. We further note there is a 
danger in accepting the School District’s argument: if that 
portion of Tinker is broadly construed, an assertion of 
virtually any “rights” could transcend and eviscerate the 
protections of the First Amendment. In any event, we agree 
with J.S. that, as a matter of law, [the principal] could not 
succeed in his claim that the profile violated his right to be 
free from defamation.125 
The court, in other words, implied that if Tinker’s “rights of 
others” prong is valid and applies, it must involve a formal 
legal right only.126 Here, the court concluded that the principal 
had not been defamed: the content was so patently outrageous 
and could not be taken seriously.127 It remains to be seen if 
courts in other jurisdictions agree that Tinker’s “individual 
rights” prong is more than mere dicta and, if so, whether those 
courts will apply the “individual rights” standard as rigidly as 
the J.S. court did by limiting its application to formal legal 
rights. 
Some courts have not specifically considered Tinker’s 
“individual rights” prong, even when an individual has been 
negatively affected. In such instances, courts have rejected 
speech restrictions and discipline for minor offensiveness or 
discomfort. Examples include a principal upset by an offensive 
and vulgar student website criticizing him and the school;128 
 
 125 J.S. v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (2011), at 931 n.9 (citations 
omitted).  
 126 Id. 
 127 Id. at 928. 
 128 Beussink v. Woodland R-IV Sch. Dist., 30 F. Supp. 2d 1175 (E.D. Mo. 1998). 
Hostetler Macro.docx (Do Not Delete) 3/3/14  2:03 PM 
1] OFF-CAMPUS CYBERBULLYING 21 
 
two teachers upset by a student’s offensive and lewd “top ten” 
lists about them, causing one to have “a hard time doing his 
job” and another to “almost come to tears;”129 a school anti-
harassment policy ruled to be overbroad by precluding all 
offensive speech;130 and student placards with a website 
address, which directed users to a site that contained graphic 
images of terrorist beheadings.131 These provide support for the 
notion that the individual harm must be extensive for speech to 
be considered substantially disruptive to an individual. 
IV.  PROPOSAL TO MERGE TITLE IX’S “EDUCATIONAL 
DEPRIVATION” AND TINKER’S “SUBSTANTIAL DISRUPTION” 
STANDARDS 
The above discussion exposes at least two difficult and 
unanswered legal questions: whether bullying’s harmful effects 
on an individual’s or group’s educational rights may suffice as a 
basis for discipline under Tinker, and if so, how should these 
rights be measured and proved? As the Third Circuit Court of 
Appeals has succinctly stated, “[t]here is no constitutional right 
to be a bully” on campus.132 Similarly there is no right to harass 
another student on campus; Titles VI and IX provide such 
safeguards relating to race and gender based discrimination.133 
However, the Third Circuit court noted that a school’s efforts to 
prohibit harassment might also conflict with student free 
speech rights under Tinker when such harassment includes 
offensive, disparaging speech that involves religious or political 
 
 129 Killion v. Franklin Reg’l Sch. Dist., 136 F. Supp. 2d 446 (W.D. Pa. 2001) 
(“Disliking or being upset by the content of a student’s speech is not an acceptable 
justification for limiting student speech under Tinker.”). 
 130 Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 215 (3d Cir. 2001) (Alito, J.) 
(“[T]he mere fact that someone might take offense at the content of speech is not 
sufficient justification for prohibiting it.”). 
 131 Bowler v. Town of Hudson, 514 F. Supp. 2d 168 (D. Mass. 2007) (noting that 
school officials’ concerns about the potential of students’ psychological reaction and 
need for “counseling to cope with their subsequent feelings of helplessness and despair” 
were too vague and unspecific). 
 132 Sypniewski v. Warren Hill Reg’l Bd. of Educ., 307 F.3d 243, 264 (3d Cir. 
2002).  
 133 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2012). Although both Title IV 
and Title IX involve similar protections and analyses, this Article refers only to Title IX 
as shorthand for both and because it seems that cases involving the issue of off-campus 
conduct affecting individual educational deprivation arise primarily under Title IX.   
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content.”134 The Third Circuit summarizes the law as follows: 
Although mere offense is not a justification for suppression of 
speech, schools are generally permitted to step in and protect 
students from abuse [on campus]. Even where harassment by 
name calling does not involve a racial component, and even 
where there is no special history of disruption, prohibition 
accompanied by the threat of sanction is—and has always 
been—a standard school response. Students cannot hide 
behind the First Amendment to protect their “right” to abuse 
and intimidate other students at school. Outside the school 
context, of course, much harassment by name calling 
(understood broadly) is protected. But the First Amendment 
does not interfere with basic school discipline.135 
This article suggests that the most predictable and logical 
legal standard for proving an actual or reasonably foreseeable 
substantial disruption based on individual or group educational 
impact can be found in Title IX of the 1972 Educational 
Amendments, which protects against gender-based 
discrimination, including harassment and hostile environment 
claims.136 Title IX claims are guided, in part, by the Supreme 
Court’s 1999 opinion in Davis v. Monroe.137 Accordingly, 
proving a Title IX violation by a school requires evidence that a 
student has been subject to conduct “so severe, pervasive, and 
objectively offensive that it effectively bars the victim’s access 
to an educational opportunity or benefit” (referred to herein as 
the “educational deprivation” standard).138 This test includes 
both a subjective element as well as an objective element. The 
plaintiff must show a subjective belief the conduct was so 
offensive that he or she could not have obtained his or her 
education, and the plaintiff must also show that an objective 
person would have experienced the same form of 
 
 134 Id.  
 135 Id. (emphasis added).  
 136 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1688 (2006); see also T.K. v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 
779 F. Supp. 2d 289, 314 (E.D. N.Y. 2011) (distinguishing from the statute because the 
case involved on-campus bullying of a special education student). The court in T.K. 
considered whether the existence of bullying could be proof that a school failed to 
provide a Free Appropriate Public Education under the Individual with Disabilities 
Education Act, while providing an extensive review of federal case law. T.K., 779 F. 
Supp. 2d at 309–19. 
 137 Davis v. Monroe, 526 U.S. 629 (1999).  
 138 Id. at 632 (emphasis added).  
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discrimination.139 When read in pari materia140 with the 
standards that have evolved from Tinker, a well-defined 
standard is created that will prove useful to practitioners, 
parents, and pupils. Further, at least one federal district court 
has acknowledged that “general principles of anti-harassment 
law may be relevant” to the Tinker analysis.141 Also, Judge 
Kozinski, in his dissent in Harper, acknowledges that 
“[h]arassment law might be reconcilable with the First 
Amendment, if it is limited to situations where the speech is so 
severe and pervasive as to be tantamount to [disruptive] 
conduct.”142 
In addition to these admittedly limited judicial references, 
there are several reasons justifying the use of Title IX’s 
“educational deprivation” standard. First, is well-established 
and somewhat predictable. Second, it comports well with 
Tinker’s acknowledgment of schools’ responsibilities to protect 
students’ individual rights; i.e., student access to educational 
opportunities and benefits. Third, common sense seems to 
dictate simplicity and uniformity by using an already 
established and more predictable legal standard (rather than 
creating another standard or doing nothing to clarify existing 
confusion). 
We can, at this time, only guess if and how courts would 
apply a merged standard to off-campus cyberspeech. That is, 
how will courts determine whether off-campus cyberbullying 
has impeded a victimized individual or group from enjoying 
educational benefits on campus? There already exists 
established extensive precedent for applying Title IX 
protections in cases involving educational deprivations caused 
by off-campus behavior.143 This is best exemplified in the 
 
 139 Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21–22 (1993). 
 140 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 862 (9th ed. 2009) (defined as a “canon of 
construction that statutes that are in pari materia may be construed together, so that 
inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on the 
same subject.”). Naturally, the approach is one that suggests conflating a standard of 
jurisprudence that has evolved in interpreting Titles VI and IX with a speech standard 
for off-campus cyberspeech, but it is a standard that nonetheless would prove helpful in 
the absence of clarity from the United States Supreme Court regarding the subject. 
 141 Sypniewski v. Warren Hills Reg’l Bd. Of Educ., No. 01-3061, 2001 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 25388, *62 n.13 (D.N.J. 2001). 
 142 Harper, 445 F.3d 1166, at 1198 (Kozinski, J., dissenting). 
 143 See Crandell v. New York Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 87 F. Supp. 2d 304, 316 
n.126 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th 
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Supreme Court’s 1998 Title IX ruling in Gebser v. Lago Vista 
Indep. Sch. Dist.,144 which involved a teacher and student who 
were engaged in a sexual relationship that occurred extensively 
off-campus.145 An oft-used test146 emerged from the case; 
namely, to prove that an educational deprivation occurred, the 
party must show that (1) a school district official, with the 
ability to implement corrective measures, knew of the 
inappropriate conduct; and (2) that despite having knowledge 
of the inappropriate conduct, the educational entity 
deliberately failed to respond properly.147 
A. What’s good for Title IX ought to be good for Tinker. 
Tinker’s analysis should be extended to off-campus speech 
affecting on-campus individual educational opportunities. It is 
suggested here that Title IX’s “educational deprivation” 
standard be applied across the board to all instances of off-
campus cyberbullying, not just to instances involving gender-
based harassment.148 Resorting to this approach would be 
necessary only if the speech could not be restricted otherwise 
under any already-established First Amendment bases (i.e., 
under Tinker—regarding substantial disruption to school 
operations, Bethel, Morse, etc.). Thus, if the off-campus 
cyberbullying effectively denies, or is likely to deny, the victim 
his or her on-campus educational benefits (under the Title IX 
 
Cir. 1997) (upholding Title IX claims where all sexual contact occurred off school 
property), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. 524 U.S. 274 (1998)); Doe v. Claiborne 
County, Tenn., 103 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1996) (upholding claim where some incidents of 
misconduct took place off campus) rev’d in part on other grounds by Gebser v. Lago 
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (according to Phillips v. Anderson County 
Bd. of Educ., No. 3:06-CV-35, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92120, at *33 n.5 (E.D. Tenn. 
2006)); Warren v. Reading Sch. Dist., 82 F. Supp. 2d 395 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Doe v. School 
Admin. Dist. No. 19, 66 F. Supp. 2d 57 (D. Maine 1999) (upholding claim where all 
misconduct occurred off campus); Donovan v. Mount Ida College, 1997 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 23048 (D. Mass. Jan 3, 1997) (some incidents of misconduct occurred off 
campus); Patricia H. v. Berkeley Unified Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1288, 1296−97 (N.D. 
Cal. 1993) (all misconduct occurred off campus). 
 144 Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
 145 Id. at 278. 
 146 See, e.g., Jennings v. Univ. of N.C., 482 F.3d 686, 701 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 147 Id. at 290–92. 
 148 However, it is worth noting that when there are off-campus activities which 
do result in a form of gender discrimination that satisfy the requirements of Lago 
Vista, the school will be required to respond and take prompt action to end the hostile 
environment caused by the sexual harassment. 
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standard), this presumably meets Tinker’s “substantial 
disruption” test. Alternatively, a court may choose to apply 
Tinker’s “individual rights” prong if it does not consider it 
dicta. 
Applying this standard to two of the aforementioned cases, 
J.C. and Kowalski, would likely improve the predictability of 
their results. In J.C., the judge noted that the plaintiff would 
have failed at least one of the elements of the Title IX test, 
namely the objective analysis: “J.C.’s video was not violent or 
threatening. There was no reason for the School to believe that 
C.C.’s safety was in jeopardy or that any student would try to 
harm C.C. as a result of the video.”149 Kowalski proves a 
tougher case, despite similar facts, as it used a somewhat 
speculative analysis and eschewed more widely adopted rules 
concerning off-campus speech.150 Under a Title IX analysis, the 
Kowalski court would have more pronounced standards for on-
campus and off-campus regulation of speech to rely upon, and 
would be bound by the Davis subjective and objective test when 
determining whether regulation of a student’s off-campus 
speech was proper. 
V. CONCLUSION 
School officials, attorneys, and the lower courts need 
greater clarity in knowing how to balance student safety, 
effective school operations, and student free speech rights. 
Bullying victims, most of all, need protection and freedom from 
cyberbullying. All who have a role and interest in the dangers 
and problems of cyberbullying will be well served if the 
Supreme Court, someday soon, provides us with greater legal 
clarity. Until then, this article argues that the Title IX 
“educational deprivation” standard conjoined with Tinker’s 
“substantial disruption” test provides a useful, common sense, 
and legally sound basis to resolve some of the ambiguities and 
uncertainty in this area of the law. 
 
 
 149 J.C. ex rel. R.C., 711 F. Supp. 2d at 1098, 1117 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 150 See supra notes 71–80 and accompanying text. 
